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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: A CASE STUDY BROUGHT TO YOU BY THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT 
 
Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker's man. 
Bake me a cake as fast as you can. 
Pat it, and prick it, and mark it with "B" 
And put it in the oven for Baby and me!1 
 
EDWARD J. SCHOEN 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,2 the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled seven to two that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (“the Commission”) violated 
the free exercise rights of a baker, who refused to sell a custom-designed wedding cake to a gay 
couple, by reflecting hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs during public hearings in the 
case and treating him differently from three other bakers who objected to creating wedding cakes 
with messages expressing derogatory views of same-sex marriage.3  In reaching its decision, the 
Court sidestepped the chore of reconciling two fundamental principles: (1) whether the baker’s 
refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage reception was protected by his First 
Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and against compelled speech, and (2) whether 
Colorado has authority to protect the rights and dignity of gay people who seek to purchase goods 
and services for their wedding through its anti-discrimination statute.4  Instead, the Court ruled the 
Commission violated its obligation to consider the baker’s sincere religious objections with “the 
requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed.”5  In doing so, the Court acknowledged 
it postponed the reconciliation of the protections of free exercise of speech and religion and the 
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to future cases, which “must be 
resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without 
subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”6 
                                                          
1 Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker’s man, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 20, 2018), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pat-a-cake,_pat-a-
cake,_baker%27s_man. . 
 J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey 08028. 
2 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
3 Id. at 1729-32.  The facts of the Masterpiece Cakeshop case are examined in Part II.  Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan and Gorsuch joined.  Justice 
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Justice Gorsuch joined.  Justice 
Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Breyer joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion in 
which Justice Alito joined.  Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.   
4 Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Cites Agency Hostility in Ruling for Christian Baker, ABA JOURNAL (June 
4, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_rules_for_christian_ baker_who_refused_cake_ 
for_gay_wedding_ci/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.    
5 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.  Weiss, supra note 4.   
6 Id. at 1732.  Another reported case dealing with a wedding vendor who refused to sell a wedding cake to a same-
sex couple is In the matter of: Melissa Elaine Klein, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, Case Nos. 44-14 & 45-14 (Oregon 
 The Masterpiece Cakeshop decision decidedly failed to live up to its advanced billing.  
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of University of California at Berkeley School of Law, had hailed the 
case as a “blockbuster” involving a “profoundly significant” issues: whether a business has a 
“constitutional right to discriminate based on its owner’s beliefs” or whether the government’s 
interest in eradicating sexual-orientation discrimination is more important than the business’s 
freedom to choose its customers.7  The Cato Institute declared Masterpiece Cakeshop to be “an 
irresistibly compelling case because it appears to present a stark conflict between rights: the right 
to be free from discrimination, on the one hand, and the rights of free speech and the free exercise 
of religion, on the other.”8  The American Bar Association’s Preview of United States Supreme 
Court Cases summed up the importance of the case as follows: 
 
This is one of the most closely watched cases on the Court’s docket this term.  
That’s because it deals with a critical and controversial follow-up issue to the 
Court’s ruling in Obergefell: If same-sex couples have a right to marry (as they do), 
then do they also have a right to anti-discrimination protection under state and local 
laws, as against a wedding-cake artist’s rights to free speech and free association?9 
 
An article in the ABA Journal described Masterpiece Cakeshop as “one of the most debated 
and anticipated of the term, in no small part because it involves the law of cake and whether cake 
speaks” and because it is “at the forefront of a debate about whether creative professionals,” 
including bakers, florists, caterers and photographers, “must provide their services for same-sex 
weddings when they have religious objections” to same-sex marriage.10   
                                                          
Bureau of Labor and Industries) (Order dated July 2, 2015), accessed on July 16, 2018 at 
https://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweet%20Cakes%20FO.pdf, in which: (n.b. this link works) 
 
Sweetcakes by Melissa, an Oregon bakery, refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on 
the owners' religious convictions about marriage.  The couple filed a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of 
Labor and Industries, and the ALJ determined the bakery's refusal to make a wedding cake for the couple 
constituted discrimination based on their sexual orientation, which is prohibited by Oregon's public 
accommodation law.  The ALJ ordered Sweetcakes by Melissa to pay $135,000 in damages to the couple for 
emotional and mental suffering resulting from the denial of service.  The bakery's owners are challenging the 
Oregon Bureau of Labor's decision in the Oregon Court of Appeals as a violation of their freedom of religion, 
arguing the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty prohibits such a ruling.  Specifically, on appeal, 
the owners argue the decision violates their rights as artists to free speech, their rights to religious freedom, 
and their due process rights.  It is worth noting, however, that Sweetcakes by Melissa recently closed the 
bakery. 
 
L. Darnell Weeden, Marriage Equality Laws Are a Threat to Religious Liberty, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211, 218-20 
(2017). 
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, Is There a Constitutional Right for a Business to Not Serve Customers?, ABA J. (Nov. 30, 
2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_there_a_constitutional_right_for_a_business_to_not_serve_customers/.    
8 Christopher Landau & Sopan Joshi, Looking Ahead: October Term 2017, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2017). 
9 Steven D. Schwinn, Can a State Apply Its Anti-discrimination Law to a Wedding Cake Artist Who Refuses to Make 
a Wedding Cake for a Same-Sex Couple Because of His Religious Objections to Same-Sex Marriage?, 45 ABA 
PREVIEW 95 (2017). 
10 Mark Walsh, Speech, Religion and Bias All Weighed in Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, ABA J. (Nov. 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/speech_religion_bias_masterpiece_cakeshop/P1.  See also Deborah A. 
Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083 (2017) (anticipating what the potential 
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop may have on constitutional law concerning intimate liberties). 
 Greeted as a blockbuster, Masterpiece Cakeshop emerged as a dud in which neither party 
clearly prevailed.  While the Court ruled in favor of Phillips, it did so on more constricted grounds 
than he sought.  The court ruled against the Commission, but hinted that future cases must be 
resolved with tolerance and without subjecting gay persons to indignities.11  Perhaps the best 
explanation for the Court’s narrow decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop appears in an editorial 
authored by Christine Emba for The Washington Post: 
 
 Here’s the complexity: The United States prides itself on its pluralism.  And 
in a pluralistic society, differing beliefs in private inevitably lead to clashes of 
action in public, as in the Masterpiece case.  Someone will have to decide which 
actions are allowed, and thus whose rights take priority in public.  Someone will 
have to choose whether we value more that the baker be able to practice his religion 
freely or that a same-sex couple be free from one particular form of discrimination. 
 But how to decide?  That is what the court clearly did not want to do in this 
instance — and wisely so.  When judicial review gets ahead of public consensus, it 
can leave the questions at hand more unsettled, not less.  Instead, these decisions 
are ones that we, as citizens, will need to carefully take up. 
 The problem is that we aren’t ready to.  What we are missing is an 
overarching idea of the common good, one that all citizens have bought into and 
can share.  Because the only way to decide which of two competing rights wins out 
is to decide which best points us toward the larger good we want to achieve, and 
prioritize that.12 
 
Nonetheless Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an excellent opportunity to analyze 
fundamental and clashing principles underlying the case: whether Phillips’ creation of custom 
designed wedding cakes is a form of protected speech, whether requiring Phillips to sell wedding 
cakes to same-sex couples violates his right not to engage in compelled speech, whether Phillips 
can refuse to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple as an exercise of religion, and whether 
denying same-sex couples the right to purchase goods and services for their wedding can be 
constitutionally prohibited under state anti-discrimination laws.   
 
II. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
Jack Phillips, an expert baker, owned and operated a bakery called Masterpiece Cakeshop 
in Lakewood, Colorado for 24 years.  He offered a variety of baked goods, including cookies, 
brownies, and elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday, anniversary and wedding 
celebrations.  Phillips is a devout Christian whose “main goal in life is to be obedient to” Jesus 
Christ and Christ’s “teaching in all aspects of his life.”13  Phillips “seeks to honor God through his 
work at Masterpiece Cakeshop,” and firmly believes that “God’s intention for marriage from the 
beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one-man and one-woman” and that 
                                                          
11 Christine Emba, Supreme Court Wasn't Ready to Decide on the Wedding Cake; Neither Are We, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
June 11, 2018, at p. A10, http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/supreme-court-masterpiece-cakeshop-
gay-marriage-lgbt-opinion-20180611.html.      
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 1724. 
“creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be the equivalent to participating in a 
celebration that is contrary to his own deeply held beliefs.”14   
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins entered Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and told Phillips they were interested in ordering a cake for their upcoming wedding in 
Massachusetts and ensuing reception in Colorado.  They did not mention the design of the wedding 
cake they envisioned.  Phillips told Craig and Mullins that he does not “create” wedding cakes for 
same-sex weddings, and offered to make them birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies and 
brownies.  Craig and Mullins then left the shop without any further discussion.  The following day, 
Craig’s mother, who had been present in the bakery and witnessed Craig and Mullins’ interaction 
with Phillips, telephoned Phillips and asked why he declined to serve her son.  Phillips replied that 
he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to 
same-sex marriage and because Colorado did not recognize same-sex weddings.  He further 
explained that his creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding celebrates an event that goes 
directly against the teachings of the Bible, and his doing so would be viewed as his personal 
endorsement of that relationship.15   
At that time Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages; however, the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA), pursuant to amendments enacted in 2007 and 2008, prohibited 
discrimination in places of public accommodation -  broadly defined as “any place of business 
engaged in sales to the public”16 -  on the basis of sexual orientation.17  In September 2012, Craig 
and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in the 
Colorado Civil Rights Division (“the Division”).  In their complaint, Craig and Mullins alleged 
that they were denied “full and equal service” at the bakery and that Phillips “standing business 
practice” was not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings.18  The Division opened an 
investigation, and the investigator assigned to the complaint determined that, because of his 
religious beliefs, Phillips declined to sell custom wedding cakes to Craig and Mullins and about 
six other same-sex couples.  The investigator found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA 
and referred the case to the Commission.19   
The Commission determined that a formal hearing should be conducted, and forwarded the 
case to a state administrative law judge (“the ALJ”).  On cross motions for summary judgment, 
the ALJ determined no disputes of material fact existed, decided Phillips’ actions constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins.  Phillips 
argued that CADA’s compelling him to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage violated his 
First Amendment right not to express a message with which he disagreed and his First Amendment 
right to free exercise of religion.  The ALJ rejected the compelled speech argument on the grounds 
preparing a cake was not protected speech and making Phillips create a cake for a same-sex 
wedding did not force him to adhere to an ideological point of view.  The ALJ rejected the free 
                                                          
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 1725 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–601(1) (2017)). 
17 Id. at 1725 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017)).  The Court quoted the following language from 
CADA: “It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or 
deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, 
national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of a place of public accommodation.” 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1726.   
exercise of religion argument because CADA was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” 
and applying it to Phillips did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.20  
The Commission fully affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and ordered Phillips to “cease and 
desist” his refusal to sell wedding cakes to same sex-couples, institute staff training on CADA’s 
public accommodations requirements, and prepare quarterly compliance reports for two years 
documenting the number of customers denied service, the reasons for the denial of service, and a 
description of the remedial actions taken.21 
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Commission’s decision and order, and rejected Phillips’ constitutional arguments.  The Court of 
Appeals determined that selling a wedding cake to a same-sex couple did not “convey a celebratory 
message about same-sex marriage” and that compelling Phillips to comply with a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability does not constitute interference with the free exercise of religion.22  
The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Phillips appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court which, as noted above, ruled the Commission violated the free exercise rights of Phillips, 
because it failed to consider Phillips’s sincere religious objections with requisite neutrality. 23 
 
III. HOW DID THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SIDESTEP THE ISSUES? 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court assessed the challenge it faced in resolving the issues presented 
by Masterpiece Cakeshop early in its decision:  
 
The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two 
principles.  The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to 
protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but 
who face discrimination when they seek goods or services.  The second is the right 
of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as 
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.24 
 
Having made this preliminary assessment, the Court then quickly established a two-paragraph exit 
strategy to avoid deciding those “difficult questions”:   
 
 One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent 
of the baker's refusal to provide service.  If a baker refused to design a special cake 
with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words 
with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at 
all.  In defining whether a baker's creation can be protected, these details might 
make a difference. 
 The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free 
exercise claim.  A baker's refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is 
cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the 
cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally 
                                                          
20 Id.   
21 Id.   
22 Id. at 1727. 
23 Id. at 1732. 
24 Id. at 1723. 
but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of 
possibilities that seem all but endless.25 
 
The Court’s claim that it was difficult to identify the exact service Phillips failed to provide 
or the precise religious exercise impeded is misplaced, as Justice Thomas points out in his 
concurring opinion discussed more fully below.  Phillips told Craig and Mullins he would not 
create a wedding cake for a same sex marriage, and told Craig’s mother that he did not create 
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because doing so was contrary to his religious beliefs.  
Hence, by fretting about the exact service Phillips declined to provide or the precise religious 
exercise Phillips was denied, the Court creates a smoke screen to hide the undisputed fact Phillips 
refused to create and sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple.   
Having obfuscated Phillips’ refusal to create the wedding cake for a same-sex couple, the 
Court then switches gears and decides the Commission failed to consider the case with “religious 
neutrality.”26  The Court gleaned this hostility from comments the commissioners made during the 
Commission’s formal, public hearings on May 30, 2014, and July 25, 2014.  During the former 
hearing, commissioners “endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried 
into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less 
than fully welcome in Colorado's business community”; and one commissioner suggested that 
Phillips can believe what he chooses, but cannot act on those religious beliefs if he want to do 
business in Colorado and that a businessman who wants to do business in the state but has an issue 
with the law’s impact on his religious beliefs better be able to compromise.27  During the former 
meeting, another commissioner stated:  
 
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting.  
Freedom of religion and religion has [sic] been used to justify all kinds of 
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the 
holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where 
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination.  And to me it is one of 
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion 
to hurt others.28 
 
The commissioner then continued his line of thought by comparing Phillips’ invocation of his 
religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.   
Noting that none of the Commissioners objected to these comments during the hearings, 
that the state court ruling affirming the commissioners’ did not mention the comments, and that 
the commissioners failed to disavow the comments in briefs submitted to the Court, the Court said 
it “cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of 
the Commission's adjudication of Phillips’ case.”29    
 The Court buttressed this conclusion by examining three other decisions of the Division 
dealing with bakers who refused to create cakes which intermingled disparaging comments about 
same-sex marriage with quotations from religious text.30  The customer requesting the cakes, 
                                                          
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 1723. 
27 Id. at 1729. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 A description of the cakes Jack ordered appears in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion as follows: 
William Jack, filed a complaint with the Division in which he alleged that the cakes he ordered 
reflected his religious beliefs and that the bakers refused to make the cakes because they disagreed 
with his religious beliefs.31  In all three cases, the Civil Rights Commission ruled in favor of the 
bakers and against the customer, because the requested cakes contained language and images 
which the bakers found to be derogatory and because the bakers offered to sell other products to 
the customer.  In contrast, the Court noted, the Commission ruled against Phillips at least in part 
because the message conveyed on the cake would be attributed to the customer rather than Phillips, 
and, in reaching this decision, dismissed Phillips’ offer to sell birthday and shower cakes and 
cookies and brownies to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant.32  Hence, the Court concluded, 
“the Commission's consideration of Phillips' religious objection did not accord with its treatment 
of [William Jack’s] objections.”33 
 The Court noted that Phillips pressed the Commission’s disparate treatment of his religious 
beliefs before the Colorado Court of Appeals and that the Court of Appeals addressed this issue 
“only in passing” in a footnote as follows:  
 
This case is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division’s recent 
findings that [other bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian 
patron on the basis of his creed when they refused to create the requested cakes.  
(Citation omitted.).  In those cases . . . there was no impermissible discrimination 
because the Division found that the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron's request . . . 
because of the offensive nature of the requested message.34 
 
This “footnote does not,” the Court emphasized, “answer the baker's concern that the 
State's practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection,” because the difference in 
treatment of Phillips’ and Jack’s complaints “cannot be based on the government’s own assessment 
of offensiveness.  Just as ‘no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’ ”35  Hence the Court concluded, by failing “to 
proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs,” “the Commission's 
treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or 
regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.”36 
                                                          
  
William Jack visited three Colorado bakeries.  His visits followed a similar pattern.  He requested two cakes 
“made to resemble an open Bible.  He also requested that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses.  [He] 
requested that one of the cakes include an image of two groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the 
image.  On one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] ... ‘God hates sin. Psalm 45:7’ and on the opposite side of 
the cake ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’  On the second cake, [the one] with the image 
of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners' and on the 
other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans 5:8.’ 
 
Id. at 1749. 
31 Id. at 1735.  This information appears in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion. 
32 Id. at 1730. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 1730-31. 
35 Id. at 1731 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 62 (1943)). 
36 Id.  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky disagrees the statements cited by the Court are sufficient to demonstrate hostility to 
Phillips’ religious viewpoint.  He noted that none of the statements quoted by the Court involved “bakers who were 
violating the Colorado statute by discriminating based on race, religion, sex or sexual orientation.”  He continued: 
“It is ironic that these mild statements were taken as establishing religious discrimination and President Trump’s 
 IV. OTHER WEDDING VENDOR DISCRIMINATION CASES: FLOWERS, PHOTOGRAPHY AND 
RECEPTION VENUE 
 
In addition to Masterpiece Cakeshop, there are a handful of cases dealing with same-sex 
couples’ claims of discrimination against various wedding vendors who refused to make floral 
arrangements for, or photograph or cater the wedding ceremony and reception.37  In State of 
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., Baronelle Stutzman, the owner of Arlene’s Flowers, who 
for years sold flowers to Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed, a gay couple, refused to sell them flowers 
for their marriage on the grounds creating an arrangement of flowers for a same-sex marriage was 
contrary to her religious beliefs.38  The Attorney General’s Office filed an action on behalf of 
same-sex couple in Benton County Superior Court, which entered judgment for the same-sex 
couple and awarded permanent injunctive relief and money damages to Ingersoll and Freed.39  On 
direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court decided (1) Stutzman’s refusal to sell flowers to a 
same-sex couple for their wedding ceremony and celebration constituted discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation contrary to the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)40; 
(2) WLAD does not violate First Amendment speech protections, because the sale of floral 
arrangements is not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment41; and (3) WLAD did 
not violate Stutzman’s right to religious exercise provided by the Washington Constitution42 and 
by the First Amendment.43  The Court concluded: 
 
                                                          
repeated calls of a Muslim ban did not.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservatives’ victories in key cases are a harbinger 
of what is to come, ABA J. (July 2, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_a_harbinger_of_what_is_to_come/?utm_source=maestro&ut
m_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email.       
37 Helpful and insightful discussion of these cases can be found in following law review articles: Angela C. 
Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593, 1608-12 (2017) 
and Curtis Schube, SOGI Laws, Their Threat to Religious Liberty, and How to Combat their Trend, 64 DRAKE L. 
REV. 883, 893-901 (2016).  See also Ayesha Khan, The Butcher, the Baker, the Candlestick Maker: When Non-
Discrimination Principles Collide with Religious Freedom, 50 Aug. Md. B.J. 42 (2017) and Douglas Laycock, The 
Wedding Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2018).   
38 State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W. 
3047 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2017) (No. 17-108), vacating judgment, 2018 W.L. 3096308 (June 25, 2018). 
39 Id. at 548-51.  Notably these wedding vendor cases are not isolated examples of businesses refusing to provide 
services because of the storeowner’s disagreement with the view of customers.  Professors Stephanie Barclay and 
Mark Rienzi report: 
 
After the recent neo-Nazi demonstrations in Charlottesville, a swarm of businesses reacted by refusing to 
continue providing services to white supremacist organizations.  A salon refused to continue styling the hair 
of a politician who would not take a position supportive of LGBT rights.  A gay coffee shop owner recently 
refused to serve a group of pro-life activists, ejecting them from his store. . . . If one thinks that any of these 
businesses are justified in denying their services to individuals, groups, or events to which they object, then 
one must acknowledge that the government does not have an unassailable interest in coercing the provision 
of any product or service that is already offered to the public.”   
 
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As Applied Challenges? A Defense of 
Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1629-30 (2018). 
40 Id. at 551-53. 
41 Id. at 556-60. 
42 Id. at 562-65. 
43 Id. at 566-67. 
The State of Washington bars discrimination in public accommodations on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  Discrimination based on same-sex marriage constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  We therefore hold that the 
conduct for which Stutzman was cited and fined in this case - refusing her 
commercially marketed wedding floral services to Ingersoll and Freed because 
theirs would be a same-sex wedding - constitutes sexual orientation discrimination 
under the WLAD.  We also hold that the WLAD may be enforced against Stutzman 
because it does not infringe any constitutional protection.  As applied in this case, 
the WLAD does not compel speech or association.  And assuming that it 
substantially burdens Stutzman's religious free exercise, the WLAD does not 
violate her right to religious free exercise under either the First Amendment or 
article I, section 11 because it is a neutral, generally applicable law that serves our 
state government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in public 
accommodations.44  
 
In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, Vanessa Willock e-mailed Elane Photography, 
LLC to request that it photograph her commitment ceremony to another woman.  Elaine Huguenin, 
Elan Photography’s co-owner and lead photographer, responded to Willock and told her that she 
photographs “traditional weddings” but not same-sex weddings.  Seeking to verify Elane 
Photography’s policy, Willock’s partner, Misti Collinsworth, e-mailed Elane Photography and 
asked if it would photograph a wedding without mentioning the sex of the couple.  Huguenin sent 
Collinsworth a list of prices and invited to meet with her discuss her services.  Willock filed a 
discrimination complaint based on her sexual orientation against Elane Photography with the New 
Mexico Human Rights Commission.  The Commission decided Elane Photography discriminated 
against Willock in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), which prohibits 
public accommodations from discriminating against people based on their sexual orientation.  
Elane Photography appealed to the Second Judicial District Court for a trial de novo.  On cross 
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Willock.  Elane 
Photography appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s 
decision.  The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari.45 
 Elane Photography argued that its refusal to photograph Willock’s commitment ceremony 
did not violate NMHRA, because the photographs it was asked to take captured the celebration of 
an event which was contrary to Huguenin religious beliefs and which she did not want to endorse.  
Elane Photography claimed it would have taken portrait photographs of same-sex customers, but 
not photographs of the couple holding hands or showing affection for each other, even if “the 
ceremony was part of a movie and the actors playing the same-sex couple were heterosexual.”46  
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument.  It noted that NMHRA broadly prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation “by any person in any public accommodation” 
and that Elane Photography’s provides wedding photography services to heterosexual couples but 
refuses to provide those services to homosexual couples under equivalent circumstances.  The 
Court found that Elane Photography’s argument wrongfully attempts to make a distinction 
between an individual’s status of being homosexual and his or her conduct in openly committing 
to a same-sex person.  The Court stated, “when a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
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orientation, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation,” and 
“there was no basis” to distinguish discrimination based on sexual discrimination from 
discrimination based on someone’s public commitment to a person of the same sex.  Hence, “Elane 
Photography's willingness to offer some services to Willock did not cure its refusal to provide 
other services that it offered to the general public.”47 
 The Court exhaustively examined Elane Photography’s claim that requiring it to 
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony it violated her First Amendment rights to free 
speech and free exercise of religion.  The court ruled requiring Elane Photography to photograph 
same sex weddings did not violate her right not to engage in compelled speech contrary to her 
personal beliefs, because (1) NMHRA does not compel Elane Photography to convey the 
government’s message or to affirm a belief or to host or accommodate another speaker’s message, 
and does not interfere “with Elane Photography’s editorial judgment” when it regulates its “choice 
of clients”48; and (2) observers of Elane Photography’s photographs are unlikely to associate those 
photographs with either its owner or its employees and assume Elane Photography “sees nothing 
wrong with same-sex marriage,” any more than people attending the wedding think the 
photographer and the couple getting married share the same views “on issues ranging from the 
minor (the color scheme, the hors d'oeuvres) to the decidedly major (the religious service, the 
choice of bride or groom).”49  The Court also ruled that NHMRA does not violate Elane 
Photography’s free exercise rights, because (1) “the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),” 
and (2) NHMRA is a neutral law of general applicability.”50   
 In Gifford v. McCarthy, Cynthia and Robert Gifford, owners and operators of Liberty 
Ridge Farm, LLC, rent portions of their farm to serve as a venue for wedding ceremonies and 
receptions, and employ catering, kitchen and wait staff to provide wedding-related services such 
as a food and beverages, decoration and set-up services, and flower arrangements.51  When Melisa 
McCarthy and Jennifer McCarthy, an engaged same-sex couple, sought to use Liberty Ridge as 
the venue for their wedding, Cynthia Gifford stated the farm did not host same-sex marriages.  
Alleging the Giffords engaged in unlawful discrimination based on sexual orientation, the 
McCarthys filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR).  SDHR 
investigated and found that probable cause existed to support the complaint, and an administrative 
law judge (“the ALJ”) found that Liberty Farms is a place of public accommodation and that the 
Giffords illegally discriminated against the McCarthys on the basis of their sexual orientation.  The 
ALJ awarded each McCarthy $1,500 in compensatory damages, imposed a fine in the amount of 
$10,000, and directed the Giffords to cease and desist from engaging in discriminatory practices.  
The Commissioner of Human Rights adopted the ALJ’s finding and recommendations, and the 
Giffords initiated proceedings to annul the SDHR’s determination. 
 The Court determined that Liberty Ridge’s wedding facilities “comfortably” fit within the 
definition of a public accommodation and that Cynthia Gifford’s communicated her unwillingness 
to allow the McCarthys to marry on the farm upon learning the McCarthys were a same-sex 
                                                          
47 Id. at 62. 
48 Id. at 65-67. 
49 Id. at 69-70. 
50 Id. at 73. 
51 Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 33-34 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).  The case was transferred to the Appellate 
Division pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court of Renssalaer County under Executive Law § 298 requesting 
the Appellate Division to review the determination of the State Division of Human Rights.  Id. at 33, 35. 
couple.52  The Court rejected the Giffords’ argument that they denied services to the McCarthys 
not because of their sexual orientation, but because they opposed same-sex marriages on the basis 
of their religious beliefs.  The Court stated: the “act of entering into a same-sex marriage is 
‘conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation’ and . . . there is no basis for distinguishing 
between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on someone's 
conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same sex.”53  The Court also rejected the 
Giffords’ argument that SDHR’s compelling them to cater same-sex weddings was contrary to 
their sincere religious belief that marriage is “between one man and one woman under God” and 
therefore violated their religious exercise rights.  The Court noted that the First Amendment right 
of free exercise does not relieve an individual from complying with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability, “which is not intended to regulate religious conduct or beliefs but which may 
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion.”54   
 
V. DOES CREATING A CUSTOMIZED WEDDING CAKE QUALIFY AS EXPRESSION PROTECTED 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas concludes Phillips’ creation of custom wedding 
cakes is expressive. 55  Justice Thomas observes that “the Court has recognized a wide array of 
conduct that can qualify as expressive, including nude dancing, burning the American flag, flying 
an upside-down American flag with a taped-on peace sign, wearing a military uniform, wearing a 
black armband, conducting a silent sit-in, refusing to salute the American flag, and flying a plain 
red flag.”56  Further, Justice Thomas notes, in determining whether conduct is sufficiently 
expressive, the Court asks whether the actor intended the conduct to be communicative and 
whether the conduct is reasonably understood by the viewer to be communicative.  Once the Court 
determines conduct is expressive, Justice Thomas states, “the Constitution limits the government’s 
authority to restrict or compel it.57   
 Justice Thomas then examined factors showing Phillips’ creation of custom wedding cakes 
is expression.  Phillips considers himself to be an artist.  He includes an artist’s paint palette with 
a paintbrush and baker’s whisk in the bakery’s logo.  He carefully consults with the couple to 
ascertain their preferences and the details of the wedding to ensure the cake reflects the couple 
who ordered it.  He takes exceptional care sketching the cake’s design, choosing the color scheme, 
creating the frosting, baking, sculpting and decorating the cake, and delivering the cake to the 
reception.  Phillips also thinks the wedding cake symbolically announces that “a wedding has 
occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be celebrated.”  In short, “[Phillips’] use of 
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his artistic talents to create a well-recognized symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage 
clearly communicates a message,” thereby qualifying as expressive conduct protected by the 
Constitution.58 
 Justice Thomas also castigates the determination by the Colorado Court of Appeals that 
Phillips’ conduct was insufficiently expressive to be protected from state compulsion.  The Court 
of Appeals found: (1) reasonable observers would not interpret Phillips’ creation of the wedding 
cake as an endorsement of same-sex marriage, and (2) Phillips can post a disclaimer stating 
Colorado law prohibits him discrimination on the basis or sexual orientation and his creation of a 
wedding cake for a same-sex couple does not constitute an endorsement of same-sex marriage.59  
The former argument, Justice Thomas states, “would justify any law that compelled protected 
speech” and permit public accommodations laws (such as the Massachusetts law prohibiting the 
exclusion of parade participants on the basis of their sexual orientation) to modify the speaker’s 
message.60  The latter argument, Justice Thomas claims, would “justify any law compelling 
speech,” which would permit the government to compel “speakers to affirm in one breath that 
which they deny in the next,” and would force speakers to speak when they want to remain silent.61 
 It appears, then, that a good argument exists that creating a customized wedding cake 
qualifies as expression protected under the First Amendment.  That conclusion, however, does not 
resolve Masterpiece Cakeshop, because there was no limitation placed on Phillips’ artistic 
expression.  Rather, he elected not to engage in artistic expression when he declined to create a 
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins.  Further, the only speech Phillips engaged in was his 
conversation with the same-sex couple in which he explained that he would not design a wedding 
cake for them, because doing so violated his genuinely held religious principles.  Phillips can 
certainly convey that same message to other same-sex couples, place a sign in his store window 
declaring his religious principles prohibit him from designing wedding cakes for same sex couples, 
and even place that message in advertisements promoting his bakery.  Professor Culhane provides 
a telling story about a Philadelphia cheesesteak store which illustrates this point: 
 
Joey Vento, the owner of Geno's Steaks, did not like illegal immigrants--and 
especially did not like that the area around his South Philadelphia establishment 
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A tradition from Victorian England that made its way to America after the Civil War, “[w]edding cakes are so 
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Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980)).  
had recently become populated by Spanish speakers.  So in 2006, he slapped a sign 
on the window where orders are placed: “THIS IS AMERICA. WHEN 
ORDERING, PLEASE SPEAK ENGLISH.”  The case dominated local news in 
Philly.  Vento's supporters flocked to his business, while those who were outraged 
at what they saw as thinly veiled racism queued up right across the street at Pat's 
King of Steaks, Geno's legendary competitor.  Vento was hauled before the 
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, and charged with discrimination 
against non-English speakers.  He argued that he was expressing a political point 
of view, not discriminating.  And he prevailed, because no witnesses could establish 
that Geno's Steaks actually refused service to anyone who did not speak English.  
In sum, the Commission vindicated Vento's argument that he was making a 
protected political statement, however crude and nasty.62 
 
In short, there is no First Amendment infringement on Phillips’ artistic expression.  
Phillips, like Joey Vento, can freely express his views on same-sex marriage, and as an artist he 
may continue to create and design artistic wedding cakes without interference in his artistic 
expression.  Further, because the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Colorado 
Supreme Court and invalidated the Commission’s order, Phillips is now free to refuse to sell 
wedding cakes to same-sex couples.63 
 
VI. DOES REQUIRING PHILLIPS TO SELL WEDDING CAKES TO SAME-SEX COUPLES 
CONSTITUTE COMPELLED SPEECH? 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas emphasizes that Phillips’ refusal to sell wedding 
cakes to same-sex couples stems from his religious faith, which forbids him from celebrating or 
bearing witness to same-sex marriage.64  Further, Justice Thomas noted, Phillips follows his 
religious faith in operating his bakery.   
 
Phillips routinely sacrifices profits to ensure that Masterpiece operates in a way that 
represents his Christian faith.  He is not open on Sundays, he pays his employees a 
higher-than-average wage, and he loans them money in times of need.  Phillips also 
refuses to bake cakes containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic 
messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween—even though 
Halloween is one of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries.65 
 
Moreover, Justice Thomas explains, Colorado’s justification for requiring Phillips to create 
customized cakes for same-sex couples – preventing Phillips from denigrating the dignity of same 
sex couples and subjecting same-sex couples to humiliation, frustration and embarrassment – as 
“completely foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”  “States cannot,” Justice Thomas says, 
“punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, 
or undignified,” because doing so “amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the 
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service of orthodox expression.”66  Such an objective is anathema to free speech.  Indeed, Justice 
Thomas observes, Phillips told Craig and Mullins that he would make them birthday cakes, cookies 
and brownies but just did not make cakes for same-sex weddings.  Justice Thomas said it was 
difficult to see how that statement “stigmatizes gays and lesbians more than blocking them from 
marching in a city parade, dismissing them from the Boy Scouts, or subjecting them to signs that 
say “God Hates Fags”—all of which this Court has deemed protected by the First Amendment.”67  
Further, Justice Thomas states, worries about “dignity” and “stigma” did not carry the day when 
this Court affirmed the right of white supremacists to burn a 25–foot cross, conduct a rally on 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthday, or circulate a film featuring hooded Klan members brandishing 
weapons and threatening to “bury the niggers.”68 
 Hence, according to Justice Thomas, because Phillips’s creation of customized wedding 
cakes is expression and because Phillips religious beliefs required him to refuse to make 
customized wedding cakes for same-sex couples, the Commission’s order directing Phillips to 
create customized wedding cakes for same-sex couples requires him to engage in expression with 
which he does not wish to be associated.  More particularly, forcing Phillips to create customized 
wedding cakes for same-sex couples “requires him to, at the very least, acknowledge that same-
sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and suggest that they should be celebrated – the precise message he 
believes his faith forbids.”69  Hence, the Commission likely violated Phillips’ right not to be 
compelled to engage in speech.   
 One commentator disagrees that requiring Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex 
marriages is compelled speech.70  He notes that “creating wedding cakes, even expensive, unique 
cakes is not necessarily expressive conduct,” because wedding cakes are not a traditionally 
recognized expressive medium and cannot be said to provide a particularized message.71  
Furthermore, Phillips’ equation of his artistic cake making with painting and sculpting, as 
suggested by his bakery’s name, decorations and logo, is insufficient to warrant the extension of 
protections traditionally accorded artists.  Otherwise, branding oneself as an artist would be enough 
to elevate “any craftsperson or artisan or Subway employee” to protected status and permit the 
self-proclaimed artist to deny service to customers on First Amendment grounds.72  The 
commentator concedes, however, that if the cake is “designed to bear a ‘particularized message,’ 
it may qualify as speech.”  He indicates, for example, if Craig and Mullins had asked Phillips to 
make them a tiered rainbow cake for their reception, the cake might qualify for First Amendment 
protection, because the rainbow is the widely recognized symbol of LGBT rights movement and 
would be recognized by observers as expressive speech.73   
 While the commentator’s perspective is thought-provoking, it misses the mark.  To begin 
with, Phillips is unequivocally deemed to be an expert designer of wedding cakes and has built his 
business on that reputation.  Secondly, the fact that Phillips did not discuss the design of the 
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wedding cake with Craig and Mullins does not eradicate the fact that Phillips himself believes 
creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples sends messages which were contrary to his genuinely 
held religious beliefs and with which he did not want to be associated, namely that same-sex 
weddings are weddings and that same-sex weddings should be celebrated.  Hence, it appears 
compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples constitutes compelled speech.74 
 
VII. CAN PHILLIPS REFUSE TO CREATE WEDDING CAKES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH? 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered compelled speech in four major decisions.75  In 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
the Board of Education’s resolution “ordering the salute to the flag become ‘regular part of the 
program of activities in the public schools,’ that all teachers and pupils ‘shall be required to 
participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag.’ ” 76  A student’s failure to 
participate in the salute to the flag was deemed to be “insubordination” punished by expulsion 
from school.  Readmission to school was denied until the expelled student complied, and absence 
from school during the expulsion period was considered to be an unlawful absence and grounds 
for declaring the student delinquent.  The student’s parents were liable for prosecution and, if 
convicted, subject to fines not exceeding $50 and a jail term not exceeding thirty days.77   
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 Students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses and refused to salute the flag were expelled from 
school and threatened with being sent to reformatories for juvenile delinquents, and their parents 
were prosecuted or threatened with prosecution.78  Plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court 
seeking an injunction restraining enforcement of compulsory participation in the salute the flag 
against Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose religious beliefs prohibit them from saluting the flag.79  A 
three judge panel granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the salute the flag mandate 
against the plaintiffs and all other members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.   
 The Board of Education appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court observed 
that forcing students to participate in the salute to the flag compels them to declare and affirm a 
belief in what the flag symbolizes and to “communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the 
political ideas [the flag represents].”80  Nor does the improper compulsion to participate in the 
salute the flag depend on the religious beliefs of the person objecting or the sincerity with which 
those beliefs are held, because “[w]hile religion supplies appellees’ motive for enduring the 
discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views 
hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.”81  Furthermore, 
while infringements of speech may be constitutional “to prevent grave and immediate danger to 
interests which the state may lawfully protect,” the students’ refusal to participate in the salute to 
the flag is “harmless to others.”82  Affirming the district court’s issuance of the injunction 
prohibiting the enforcement of the regulation mandating participation in the salute to the flag, the 
Court famously declared: 
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high 
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.  If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.83 
 
Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, George Maynard, a resident of New Hampshire and a 
follower of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, covered up the words “Live Free or Die” on his 
passenger vehicle license plate, because that motto was repugnant to his faith.  Mr. Maynard was 
issued three citations for violating a New Hampshire statute making it a misdemeanor to obscure 
the figures or letters on any license plate.  He was convicted on all three citations, but refused to 
pay the fines imposed by the district court.84  Mr. Maynard filed an action in federal district court 
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.  In his affidavit filed with the District Court, Mr. Maynard 
stated: “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethically, 
religiously and politically abhorrent.”85  The District Court issued an injunction enjoining New 
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Hampshire from arresting and prosecuting the Maynards for covering up that portion of their 
license plate containing the words “Live Free or Die.”86   
 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court noted: “New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that 
[the Maynards] use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological 
message or suffer a penalty,” contrary to the First Amendment, which “protects the right of 
individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way 
New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”87  The Court also 
determined that the two interests advanced by New Hampshire were not sufficiently compelling 
to justify the mandate to display the state motto on the Maynards’ license plate.  The first – that 
police officers can more readily determine whether passenger cars are carrying the proper license 
because the motto appears only on passenger car licenses – was belied by the fact that passenger 
car licenses consist of a specific configuration of letters and numbers, making the passenger 
licenses readily identifiable.  The second – the state’s desire to promote an appreciation of history, 
state pride, and individualism – was insufficient, because it was not ideologically neutral and did 
not outweigh “an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
message.”88  The Court concluded “the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to 
display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates,” and affirmed the judgment of the District 
Court.89 
 In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,90 the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (“the Veterans Council”), an 
unincorporated association of individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups 
which annually organizes and conducts Boston’s St. Patrick’s-Evacuation Day Parade (“the 
Parade”), could not be compelled by the government to allow the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group 
of Boston (“GLIB”), a social organization of persons who are homosexual or bisexual and their 
supporters, to march in the parade.91  The Court initially determined that the Parade was expression 
for purposes of the First Amendment.  It was a festive event in which people in costumes and 
uniforms, marching bands and floats, and colorful flags and banners entertained the spectators 
lining the streets and the television viewers in their homes.92  While conceding the Veterans 
Council was rather lenient in admitting diverse groups with a wide range of messages to its parade, 
relaxed admissions requirements did not forfeit the parade organizers’ constitutional protections.93  
Rather, the Court noted, the First Amendment protects the parade organizers’ rights to assemble a 
multifaceted message of their own choosing, much the same way the First Amendment protects 
cable operators’ selection of programs to be rebroadcast and newspaper editors’ assembly of 
diverse voices on the editorial page.94   
 Because GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in and communicating its 
ideas as part of the Parade,95 the state court’s application of the public accommodations act 
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produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.96  
Such compelled speech violates the fundamental autonomy given to the speakers under the First 
Amendment to choose the content of their own message.97  The Court continued: 
 
Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies 
not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements 
of fact the speaker would rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of 
defamation.  Nor is the rule’s benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by 
business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated 
expression as well as by professional publishers.  Its point is simply the point of all 
speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s 
eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.98  
 
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment,99 which was enacted by Congress in 
response to law schools’ “restricting the access of military recruiters to their students because of 
disagreement with the Government’s policy on homosexuals in the military.”100  The Solomon 
Amendment provided that, “if any part of an institution of higher education denies military 
recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain 
federal funds.”  The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), an association 
of law schools and law faculties, adopted a policy opposing discrimination based a number of 
factors including sexual orientation.  FAIR members sought to prevent military from recruiting on 
their campuses, because they objected to a policy, subsequently repealed, prohibiting a person 
from serving in the Armed Forces “if he has engaged in homosexual acts, stated that he is a 
homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.”101  Arguing that “the forced inclusion and equal 
treatment of military recruiters violated the law schools’ First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association,” FAIR initiated an action in federal district court seeking an injunction against 
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.102  The district court determined that recruiting is 
conduct and not speech and that Congress could regulate the expressive aspect of the conduct 
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under the test set forth in United States v. O’Brien,103 and denied the preliminary injunction.104  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded for the district court 
to enter a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.105 
 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Solomon Amendment did not infringe on 
FAIR’s First Amendment right to engage in speech or not to be associated with speech with which 
it disagreed.  The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment “neither limits what law schools may 
say nor requires them to say anything” and that law schools “remain free under the statute to 
express whatever views they may have on the military's congressionally mandated employment 
policy, all the while retaining eligibility for federal funds.”106  While the Court conceded that the 
law schools provide assistance to the military recruiters and that assistance involved elements of 
speech, such as e-mails or posted notices on bulletin boards, that assistance was “a far cry” from 
mandatory salute the flag exercises in Barnette107 and the “live free or die” motto in Wooley.108  
Indeed, the Court noted, accommodating the military’s recruiting message “does not affect the law 
school’s speech, because the law schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting 
receptions.”  Allowing military on campus and providing them with recruiting services are not 
inherently expressive, do not suggest law schools agree with the recruiters’ expression, and do not 
restrict what law schools may say about military policies.109  Likewise, allowing the military to 
recruit at law schools does not “associate” the law school with anything the recruiters might 
express and does not force a law school to accept members it does not want.  Recruiters are 
“outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become 
members of the school's expressive association.”  Moreover, students and faculty “are free to 
associate to voice their disapproval of the military's message,” and “nothing about the [Solomon 
Amendment] affects the composition of the group by making group membership less desirable.”110  
Reversing the Third Circuit, the Court concluded:  
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To the extent that the Solomon Amendment incidentally affects expression, the law 
schools' effort to cast themselves as just like the school children in Barnette, the 
parade organizers in Hurley, and the Boy Scouts in Dale plainly overstates the 
expressive nature of their activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on 
it, while exaggerating the reach of our First Amendment precedents.111 
 
Neither Hurley nor FAIR supports the proposition compelling Phillips to create wedding 
cakes for same-sex marriages triggers unconstitutional compelled speech.  To begin with, the 
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intimate association.  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court also said that it was not persuaded the Boy Scouts 
associate “in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral” and that Dale’s membership “does not 
violate the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association because his inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way 
[the Boy Scouts'] existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.’ ”   Id. at 647.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court concluded that Hurley does “not require deciding the case in favor of the Boy Scouts because the 
reinstatement of Dale does not compel Boy Scouts to express any message.”  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
preliminarily laid the foundation of its freedom of association analysis by focusing on the Boy Scouts’ mission 
statement - “It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young 
people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full 
potential,” id. at 649 -  the Scout Oath -  “On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and country and 
obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and 
morally straight,” id. -  and the Scout Law - “A Scout is: Trustworthy, Obedient, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave, 
Clean, Kind, Reverent,” id. -  all of which, the Court emphasized, underscored the core purpose of the Boy Scouts to 
instill a system of values and moral beliefs through engagement in expressive activity, id. at 649-650.  Further, the 
Boy Scouts claimed “it does not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior” and teaches 
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America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right.  We do not 
believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate.”  Id. at 652.  Admitting Dale to adult 
membership in the Boy Scouts as an assistant scoutmaster, the Court noted, “would, at the very least, force the 
organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”  Id. at 653.  Relying on Hurley, the Court stated that the case must be 
resolved by balancing “the associational interest in freedom of expression” with the state’s interest in eliminating 
discrimination through its public accommodations law.  Id. at 658-59.  Concluding the “state interests embodied in 
New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scout’s right to freedom 
of expressive association,” the Court held “the First Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a 
requirement through the application of its public accommodations law” and reversed the judgment of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court.  Id. at 659, 661.    
expression in Hurley was the annual parade which takes place on March 17 and combines two 
celebrations: St. Patrick’s Day and, since as early as 1737, the evacuation of royal troops and 
Loyalists from the City of Boston.112  The Veterans Council selects the organizations whose 
members participate in the parade, and, as noted above, declined to approve GLIB’s participation 
in the parade.113  While each organization selected to participate in the Parade identifies itself and 
shapes and conveys its own message as a parade participant, the Council decides what message is 
included (and celebrated) in the Parade.114  As the Court noted:  
 
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from 
potential participants, and though the score may not produce a particularized 
message, each contingent's expression in the Council's eyes comports with what 
merits celebration on that day.  Even if this view gives the Council credit for a more 
considered judgment than it actively made, the Council clearly decided to exclude 
a message it did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is 
enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking 
on one subject while remaining silent on another.115 
 
The Hurley expression differs from the Masterpiece expression, because the assembly of 
the expression in a parade is different from the assembly of expression on a wedding cake.  The 
former involves the assembly of disparate groups in a parade to form a message.  The latter 
involves the expression of a single baker opposed to same-sex marriage because his fundamental 
religious beliefs.   
 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Court determined that Massachusetts public 
accommodation law was “peculiarly applied” when it mandated the inclusion of GLIB in the 
Parade.116  “There is no dispute,” the Court noted, “about the participation of openly gay, lesbian, 
or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the parade.  [The Veterans Council] disclaim[s] 
any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have 
been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to 
march.”117  Hence Massachusetts public accommodations law was applied, not to prevent 
discrimination against individuals denied access to a place of public accommodation, but to alter 
the message the Veterans Council wished to convey in its parade.  The court explained: 
 
Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private 
organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially 
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.  Although the 
state courts spoke of the parade as a place of public accommodation . . . once the 
expressive character of both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is 
understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts' application of the statute had 
the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.  
Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals with a message would 
have the right to participate in petitioners’ speech, so that the communication 
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produced by the private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the 
law who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own.  But 
this use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the 
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own 
message.118 
 
In short, public accommodations laws cannot be used to gain admission to or alter an 
individual’s or an organization’s speech, because the speech itself, rather than individuals 
discriminated against, becomes subject to accommodation.  In contrast, when Colorado orders 
Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples, Colorado does not change Phillips’ speech 
or alter his message that he opposes same-sex marriage because it is contrary to his religious 
principles.  Hence Hurley does not support Phillips’ claim of compelled speech.119   
 Likewise, FAIR does not support the contention that Colorado’s accommodation law 
compels Phillips to engage in speech, because allowing military recruiters on campus is not 
inherently expressive and does not associate the law school with anything the recruiters might say.  
In contrast, as noted above, Phillips creation of wedding cakes arguably is expressive conduct.  
Moreover, Phillips has garnered a reputation for creating artistic wedding cakes, which are eagerly 
sought by his customers and whose authorship is recognized by the wedding guests and enforced 
by his routine participation and direction in the cake cutting part of the wedding celebration.  
Hence, unlike FAIR, the elements of expressive conduct and association are present in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. 
 In contrast to Hurley and FAIR, however, compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for 
same-sex marriages seems to fall within the purview of Barnette and Woolley, both of which 
involved compelled speech contrary to sincerely held religious beliefs.120  As noted above, creating 
wedding cakes can safely qualify as protected expression, and, like the school students forced to 
participate in the salute the flag and the New Hampshire residents forced to carry the state’s motto 
on their license plate, Phillips objects to the creation of wedding cakes for same-sex couples, 
because designing the wedding cakes is compelled expressive conduct which conflicts with his 
religious beliefs.  Hence Phillips has a good argument that Colorado’s public accommodating law 
mandating his creation and sale of wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates the First 
Amendment protection against compelled speech.  Notably, however, a significant difference 
exists between Barnette and Wooley and the situation confronting Phillips.  In both Barnette and 
Wooley the state’s interest in compelling speech contrary to genuinely held religious beliefs was 
weak.  That, as is more fully discussed in Part IX, cannot be said about the interest advanced by 
the state’s public accommodation law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, namely eliminating 
discrimination against protected classes in the sales of goods and services.121 
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 VIII. CAN PHILLIPS REFUSE TO CREATE WEDDING CAKES FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER 
THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE? 
 
This is a difficult question to answer, because it places two fundamental rights – the right 
to be free of discrimination in the purchase of goods and services and the right to exercise religion 
– in opposition to each other.  Most U.S. Supreme Court decisions have considered the 
constitutionality of statutes which effected infringements on the exercise of religion, and, at first 
blush, it seems that Masterpiece Cakeshop is the opposite, because it deals with an accommodation 
law which seeks to protect individuals against discrimination.  Nonetheless, despite its laudable 
intentions, the Colorado public accommodation law is a government statute which triggers 
infringement on the baker’s religious exercise rights and hence must pass constitutional muster. 
 Prior to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved cases which challenged legislation on the 
grounds it infringed on the party’s religious exercise rights by examining whether the infringement 
advanced a compelling interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming Free 
Exercise Clause protection.  In Sherbert v. Verner, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church was fired from her job, because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath 
Day of her religion.122  Ms. Sherbert’s application for unemployment benefits was denied by the 
Employment Security Commission on the grounds her refusal to work on Saturdays disqualified 
her under a provision of the unemployment law that required her to accept suitable work when 
offered.  The Commission’s finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas, and, upon 
appeal, affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected her claim that the 
unemployment compensation law as applied to her abridged her rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause.123  In reversing that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme 
Court decision cannot succeed against an Exercise of Religion claim unless there was no 
infringement on her free exercise rights or because the burden on her free exercise right is justified 
by a compelling state interest.124  Significantly, a South Carolina statute provided that, when textile 
plants are authorized to operate on Sundays, no employee who is conscientiously opposed to 
Sunday work can be compelled to work on Sunday.  Hence, “South Carolina expressly saves the 
Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which . . . infringes the Sabbatarian’s 
religious liberty.”125  Moreover, South Carolina failed to demonstrate a compelling justification 
for infringing on Ms. Sherbert’s religious exercise.  South Carolina claimed before the U.S. 
Supreme Court that permitting her to collect unemployment benefits might trigger specious 
unemployment benefit claims or dilute the unemployment compensation fund.  Those interests, 
however, were not raised before the South Carolina Supreme Court, and, even if they were, there 
was no evidence those concerns warranted a substantial infringement of religious liberties.126 
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, parents who were members of the Amish religion and Mennonite 
Church challenged a Wisconsin statute that required children to attend public or private school 
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until reaching age 16.127  The parents insisted that requiring their children to attend school beyond 
completion of eighth grade was contrary to their Amish religious beliefs and way of life, because 
doing so would expose them and their children to the censure of the church community, endanger 
their own and their children’s salvation, and threaten the survival of the Amish community.128  The 
parents were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory school attendance law and 
fined the sum of $5 each.129  The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions, but the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained respondent’s claim under the Free Exercise Clause and 
reversed the convictions, determining that the State failed to demonstrate its interest in establishing 
and maintaining an educational system overrides the parents’ free exercise of their religion.130  The 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that, in order for Wisconsin to compel Amish students to 
attend school beyond the eighth grade contrary to their religious beliefs, Wisconsin must 
demonstrate there is no interference with the free exercise of religious or “there is a state interest 
of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause.”131  The Court determined that the Amish parents demonstrated convincingly that 
accommodating their religious objections by not compelling one or at the most two years of 
education will not impair the physical or mental health of their children or their ability to become 
self-supporting and responsible citizens, and that the State failed to demonstrate with particularity 
how its interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting and exemption 
to the Amish.132 
 The U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana 
Employment Section Division.133  Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, worked for several years 
in the roll foundry in the Blaw-Knox Foundry, which fabricated steel for a variety of industrial 
uses.  The roll foundry closed, and Blaw-Knox transferred him to the department that fabricated 
turrets for military tanks.  On his first day on the job, Thomas realized his work was weapons 
related.  He confirmed that all of the other departments in which there were openings engaged in 
the same work.  Unable to transfer to another department and claiming his participation in the 
manufacture of military weaponry was contrary to his religious beliefs, he quit his job and applied 
for unemployment benefits.  His application for unemployment benefits was denied.  That decision 
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was reversed by the Indiana Court of Appeals, but sustained on appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Indiana, which determined that “it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis of 
his belief was” and that “another Jehovah’s Witness had no scruples about working on tank 
Turrets.”134  Deciding the denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his right to free 
exercise of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Indiana.135  The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that it was not within judicial purview to evaluate whether the employee 
“correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.”136  Rather, the narrow function of the 
reviewing court was to determine whether the worker “terminated his work because of an honest 
conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion.”137  Furthermore the interest advanced 
by Indiana for denying unemployment benefits – that widespread unemployment would result – 
was not supported by evidence and did not constitute a sufficiently compelling reason to infringe 
on Thomas’ free exercise right.138    
 In 1990, the test of “whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the 
practice of religion, and, if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government 
interest,”139 was upended by the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.140  In Smith, two members of the Native American Church 
sought unemployment benefits from the State of Oregon after they were fired from their jobs for 
ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes.  The State of Oregon denied the benefits, because 
consuming peyote was a crime; the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the compelling interest 
balancing test, ruled the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.141  Noting that 
“conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved 
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious 
beliefs,”142 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling the compelling interest balancing test “would 
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of 
almost every conceivable kind,” because every regulation of conduct as applied to a religious 
objector was presumed to be invalid, and the protection of religious liberty does not require such 
a result.143  Rather, the right of free exercise of religion does not exempt an individual from the 
obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” simply because the 
law mandates conduct contrary to the individual’s religious beliefs.144  Hence, because the 
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ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law and that law was a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability and therefore consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, the denial of 
unemployment compensation was permissible under the First Amendment.145 
 Constitutional protection of religious exercise is not provided, however, when the statute 
is not a neutral law of general applicability.  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of ordinances passed by the City 
of Hialeah prohibiting the unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.  The ordinances were passed in 
response to the announcement of Ernesto Pichardo, the president and priest of the Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (the Church”), whose congregants practice the Santeria religion, that the 
Church leased land in the City of Hialeah on which it planned to erect a church, school, cultural 
center and museum.  Pichardo also proclaimed that the Church would bring into the open the 
practice of the Santeria faith, which included ritual animal sacrifice “performed at birth, marriage, 
and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new members and priests, and during 
an annual celebration”146  Claiming that the ordinance violated their rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Church and Pichardo filed an action for declaratory judgment against the City of 
Hialeah.   
 The District Court found there were four compelling reasons supporting the enactment of 
the ordinance: (1) animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk to the practitioners and the 
general public, because the animals to be sacrificed are uninspected and often kept in unsanitary 
conditions and animal remains are found in public places; (2) animal sacrifice inflicted emotional 
injury to children who witness the sacrifice; (3) the method of killing the animals was unreliable 
and inhumane and the animals sacrificed experienced “a great deal of fear and stress”; and (4) the 
City had a compelling interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice to areas zoned for 
slaughterhouse use.  Concluding that the compelling interests of the City outweighed the interest 
of the Church and its congregants in the free exercise of religion, the District Court ruled in favor 
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which provides (1) laws that are neutral toward religion may impose the same burden on the exercise of religion as 
laws intended to burden the exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2); (2) the government is prohibited from 
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if it stems from a rule of general applicability 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(a), and (3) the government is prohibited from substantially burdening the exercise of religion, unless the 
government demonstrates the burden furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
attaining that interest, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  Notably, however, RFRA identified the “Necessary and Proper” 
clause as the enumerated power for regulating federal agencies, and the exercise of free speech clause as the 
enumerated power for regulating the states, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
subsequently decided in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997), that Congress exceeded its authority 
under the exercise of free speech clause, because the “stringent test RFRA demands” vastly exceeds “any pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.”  Id. at 533-34.  In 
response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA), 114 STAT. 803, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.  RLUIPA amended RFRA’s definition of the exercise of 
religion to eliminate any reference to the First Amendment and to define the exercise of religion to include “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A).  RLUIPA also mandated that the exercise of religion “be construed in favor a broad protection of religious 
exercise, to the maximum permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).  
The Supreme Court upheld this legislation against an Establishment Clause challenge in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (“On its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of religion that is 
not barred by the Establishment Clause.”).  As amended, RFRA provides “very broad protection for religious 
liberty,” which goes “far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally required.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2767.  See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (“neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices 
even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest”). 
146 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525-28 (1993).   
of the City of Hialeah.147  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a one-paragraph per 
curiam opinion, which stated the ordinance was consistent with the Constitution and noted the 
District Court applied a standard which was stricter than the standard applied in Smith.148 
 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, deciding the objective of the ordinances was “the 
suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service,”149 because:  
 
[T]he ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the 
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals 
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more 
religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted 
in their defense.  These ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed 
clear error in failing to reach this conclusion.150 
 
The Court also decided the ordinances “fall well below” the minimum standards of 
“general applicability,” because the ordinances are underinclusive with respect the killing of 
animals except those occasioned by religious sacrifice, underinclusive with respect to the city’s 
interest in public health by failing to address the killing and disposal of animals by hunters and the 
disposal of animal remains in restaurants’ garbage, and underinclusive because of the exemption 
provided for the slaughter or processing for sale of small numbers of hogs and cattle per week.151  
Because the ordinances were neither neutral nor of general application, strict scrutiny applied.152  
Since the ordinances were “underinclusive to a substantial extent” to the interests advanced by the 
City of Haileah and “only conduct motivated by religious conviction . . .  bears the weight of the 
government restrictions,” the ordinances failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard and were 
unconstitutional and void.”153 
 It would appear, then, that Phillips cannot refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex 
couples on the grounds doing so violates his rights under Exercise of Religion Clause.  Restrictions 
on religious exercise rights no longer have to be supported by a compelling government interest to 
pass constitutional muster, and the operative presumption employed in Sherbert, Yoder and 
Thomas that the constitutional protection of religion exercise rights invariably prevails has been 
terminated by Smith.  Further, because Colorado’s public accommodation law appears to be a 
“valid and neutral law of general applicability,”154 its constitutionality under the Exercise of 
Religion Clause is determined by Smith, and unintended and incidental infringement on the 
religious freedom of Phillips does not make the accommodation laws unconstitutional.  Notably 
this conclusion is supported by the decisions of the Washington Supreme Court in Arlene’s 
                                                          
147 Id. at 529. 
148 Id. at 530. 
149 Id. at 542. 
150 Id.  Furthermore, the Hialeah city attorney requested an opinion from the attorney general of Florida as to 
whether the City could enact an ordinance “making religious animal sacrifice unlawful.”  The attorney general 
responded that the ritual sacrifice of animals for purposes other than consumption was illegal under both state and 
the City of Hialeah’s ordinance.  Id. at 527.  This buttresses the Court’s conclusion the ordinance was drafted for the 
purpose of suppressing the religious practices of the Santeria. 
151 Id. at 543-46. 
152 Id. at 546. 
153 Id. at 547. 
154 Velte, supra note 121, at 1154 (“antidiscrimination laws are “neutral law[s] of general applicability” and thus do 
not impermissibly violate the right to the free exercise of religion).  
Flowers,155 the New Mexico Supreme Court in Elane Photography,156 and the New York 
Appellate division in Giffords,157 all of which determined that, because their respective public 
accommodation laws were valid and neutral laws of general applicability, mandating the sale of 
floral arrangements, the photographing of a commitment ceremony, and the rental of a reception 
venue did not constitute compelled speech contrary to the florist’s, photographer’s, or the caterer’s 
religious views.  Hence, it is unlikely Phillips can refuse to create and sell wedding cakes to same-
sex couples on the grounds of the Free Exercise Clause.158   
 This conclusion is supported by an essay entitled “Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop,” 
authored by Professors Terri Day and Danielle Weatherby, in which they note that “[o]pponents 
of marriage equality are increasingly asserting their own religious beliefs to justify discrimination 
against LGBT members in public accommodations.”159  Further, they state, if Phillips and other 
business owners are permitted to invoke their exercise of religion rights to refuse to serve LGBT 
customers, the government not only acquiesces to discrimination but undermines public 
accommodation laws, which “prevent the economic and social balkanization prevalent when 
businesses decide to serve only their own kind, and ensures the uninhibited flow of intra- and 
interstate commerce.”160  The authors note that both public accommodation laws and the 
government protection of free exercise of religion advance an important public purpose: 
maintenance of the social order.  Indeed, public accommodation laws were enacted for the purpose 
of maintaining social order, and First Amendment protection of religious expression has 
traditionally been tailored to achieve the same purpose.  Hence, while individuals can believe 
polygamy is consistent with their religious philosophy, anti-polygamy statutes can curb the 
practice of engaging in polygamy in order to preserve social order.161  Likewise, while members 
of the Native American Church can believe ingesting peyote in violation of criminal law is a valid 
component of their religious practices, the state can deny unemployment benefits to individuals 
convicted of violating the law, because religious ceremonies “subversive of good order” cannot 
“excuse conduct prescribed by valid criminal law which did not specifically target the religious 
practice.”162  If both public accommodation laws and First Amendment protection of the exercise 
of religion are to continue to maintain social order, enforcement of accommodation laws must 
prevail over the exercise of religion.163   
                                                          
155 Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 568.  Arlene’s Flowers is discussed supra at notes 38-44. 
156 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 73.  Elane Photography is discussed supra at notes 45-50. 
157 Gifford, 137 A.D.3d at 38-39.  Gifford is discussed supra at notes 51-54. 
158 See Velte, supra note 121, at 1154 (“To date, courts that have considered the Antidiscrimination Question have 
rejected the [exercise of religion] arguments put forth by the Religious Right.  It takes little effort to unmask these 
legal arguments for what they are--part of the Religious Right's long-game: to establish “a conservative Christian 
social order inspired by religious law.  To achieve this goal, they seek to remove religious freedom as an integral 
part of religious pluralism and constitutional democracy, and redefine it in Orwellian fashion to justify 
discrimination by an ever wider array of ‘religified’ institutions and businesses.”) 
159 Terri R. Day & Denielle Weatherby, Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 W&L L. REV. ONLINE 86, 96 
(2017). 
160 Id. at 99 (citing Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2015)). 
161 Id. at 97 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a criminal polygamy law that punished 
conduct, rather than belief, that was “in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”)). 
162 Id. at 98 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (reaffirming Congress’ power to 
regulate criminal conduct that affects interstate commerce and is “subversive of good order”)). 
163 Id. at 102.  Moreover, the authors argue, failure to enforce public accommodation laws endangers interstate 
commerce and inflicts economic losses: 
 
Similarly, Professor Kyle Velte contends that enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, because (1) antidiscrimination laws are valid laws which 
prohibit conduct the state is free to regulate,164 (2) antidiscrimination laws are not grounded in any 
religious ideology, but rather protect residents and visitors from discrimination based on 
membership in a protected class,165 (3) antidiscrimination laws “are generally applicable, because 
they do not target religiously motivated conduct and do not provide broad opportunities for secular 
exemptions,”166 and (4) antidiscrimination claims do not present “hybrid” claims, because any 
speech claim fails in discrimination cases thereby eliminating the presentation of independent 
constitutional claim.167  Professor Velte also notes that these four reasons comply with the 
requirements laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith for determining whether the 
enforcement of a criminal statute violates free exercise rights. 168 
 
IX. DO SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION LAWS TRUMP THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH? 
 
Professor Lawrence G. Sager notes that public accommodation laws are “remarkably 
widespread.”  They “exist in forty-five states, in the District of Colombia, and in a number of cities, 
and all of them “bar discrimination on race, sex, nationality, and religion, and about half bar 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity.”169  Professor Lucien 
Dhooge reports that a “growing number of states, thirty-one in all, prohibit discrimination in 
private or public employment or both on the basis of sexual orientation with a smaller number of 
states extending protection on the basis of gender identity,” and that twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia “prohibit businesses deemed to be public accommodations from refusing to 
serve prospective patrons on the basis of sexual orientation.”170   
                                                          
One of the reasons the Framers discarded the Articles of Confederation and designed a whole new 
constitutional framework was to empower a strong federal government to regulate interstate commerce.  The 
adverse economic effects caused by private discrimination in public accommodations are measurable.  
Moreover, state approval of this type of discrimination has substantial, negative effects on interstate 
commerce and encroaches on federal powers to regulate interstate commerce.  Indeed, states that acquiesce 
to discrimination by enabling religious objections like Jack Phillips’ will suffer economic losses as people 
and businesses flee to more LGBT-friendly environments, resulting in economic barriers or creating 
commercial balkanization.  Ultimately, state sanctioned private discrimination in public accommodations 
will affect interstate commerce, which raises potential Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.   
 
Id. at 99-100. 
164 Kyle C. Velte, Defeating the Religious Rights Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1, 49 
(2016). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 50. 
167 Id. at 50-51. 
168 Id. at 49. 
169 Lawrence G. Sager, In the Name of God: Structural Injustice and Religious Faith, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585, 586-
87 (2016). 
170 Lucien J. Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation – Should There Be a Religious 
Exemption for Secular Businesses?, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319, 320-21 (2015).  Professor Dhooge also 
provides an interesting analysis of the statutes’ approach in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and defining public accommodations.  Id. at 338-39.  He also finds the statutes are ”relatively uniform” 
in identifying protected classes.  He notes: 
 
Professor John Culhane argues that enforcement of sexual orientation discrimination laws 
advances an important societal interest that outweighs the right of free expression.171  He notes 
that the U.S. Constitution and federal, state and local laws have “enshrined anti-discrimination 
imperatives in law” to offer protection to enumerated categories of people, and that “the history of 
discrimination against the LGBTQ community has been no less harrowing” than discrimination 
suffered by racial minorities, especially African-Americans and Native Americans, women, and 
religious minorities.172  Even so, comparatively little protection against discrimination has been 
accorded to LGBTQ people.  No protection against discrimination is provided by federal law as of 
2018, except for a “contested reading of ‘discrimination based on sex’ under the Civil Rights 
Act.”173  Further, only “[a]bout half the states, and many localities, offer protections to sexual 
minorities (sometimes including the trans-community, but sometimes not).”  Hence, “in the rest of 
the country, it remains possible to fire a gay employee, reject a lesbian couple's attempt to purchase 
a home, and - yes - turn away a gay couple that enters a bakery to buy a wedding cake.”174  This 
permits businesses to inflict “dignitary harm” to LGBTQ people when the businesses deny basic 
services for no good reason and, in many places, leaves them to struggle to find a place to serve 
them.175  Not enforcing discrimination laws on the grounds of protecting religious expression, he 
notes, would “permit a painter [to] invite the public to his gallery at which he painted portraits of 
them for a fee but [refuse] to paint black people” and a “musician [to] invite the world to his studio 
where he wrote songs about them for a fee but [refuse] to do so for Jews or Muslims.”  Surely, he 
says, the “First Amendment protects a lot, but not that conduct.”176  LGBTQ people deserve the 
same protection.  “Where laws offer protection based on sexual identity, their very presence signals 
recognition that the state's interest in gathering that class under the anti-discrimination imperative 
is compelling,” and “slicing and dicing the categories enumerated in the law, and then to decide 
that some of them are less important than others, is to create protection with an asterisk.”177 
 The First Amendment prohibition against compelled speech protects the interests of 
speakers who do not want to be associated with or compelled to declare and affirm a belief they 
do not share.  More particularly, as noted above, forcing Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-
sex weddings requires him to acknowledge that same-sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest 
that they should be celebrated – the precise message he believes his faith forbids.  Protecting 
Phillips from compelled speech is an important First Amendment safeguard.  Nonetheless, 
                                                          
All of these statutes, with the possible exception of Minnesota, include heterosexuality, homosexuality and 
bisexuality within the term “sexual orientation.”  These statutes, with the possible exceptions of Delaware 
and Vermont, also extend the definition to include perceived orientation of persons by others.  However, only 
eighteen of these statutes expressly include gender identity or expression.  The definitions of gender identity 
and expression vary slightly among those statutes extending protection to this group.   
 
Id. at 340-41. 
171 Culhane, supra note 62, at 230.   
172 Id. at 245. 
173 Id. at 247. 
174 Id. at 247-48. 
175 Id. at 246-47.  Professor Culhane notes that Lambda Legal, a leading national LGBTQ legal advocacy 
organization, maintains a regularly updated list of state anti-discrimination laws protecting on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/in-
your-state (last visited Jan 30, 2019).  Id. at 247 n.78. 
176 Culhane, supra note 62, at 250-51. 
177 Id. at 251.  Professor Culhane’s argument that public accommodation laws must be enforced at the expense of 
restricting the right of religious exercise differs sharply from Justice Thomas’ position that enforcement of 
accommodation laws improperly compels speech contrary to the First Amendment as discussed supra at  note 69. 
granting Phillips an exemption from public accommodation laws on the grounds of compelled 
speech would allow all businesses to claim their sincerely held religious beliefs, which must be 
accepted at face value and are exempt from evaluation or question, exempt them from providing 
goods and services to same-sex couples.  Preventing the infliction of “dignitary harm” to same-
sex couples certainly outweighs Phillips’ claim of compelled speech, particularly because he can 
take various steps – e.g. placing a sign in his store window informing the public of his religious 
convictions178 – to demonstrate his lack of association with the speech he abjures.  In short, 
enforcement of public accommodation laws outweighs Phillips’ claim of compelled speech.  As 
noted by Professor Mark Strasser,  
 
The First Amendment right not to speak is less robust than commonly thought, 
especially when the State is not prescribing the content of the message at issue.  
Further, when the public does not understand the message unless further 
explanation is offered, the “message” itself likely does not trigger First Amendment 
guarantees.  Public accommodation laws are of growing importance because the 
Nation seems to be growing increasingly fractured along a variety of fault lines.  
This is not the time to gut such laws merely because some individuals have sincere 
reservations about providing services for members of disfavored groups.  The 
claimed right not to speak in these vendor cases has no basis in the First 
Amendment as currently understood.  Further, recognition of such a right would do 
great harm and lead to further tearing of the social fabric, a result that no one should 
applaud.179 
 
Hence, it appears that protecting same-sex couples from sexual orientation discrimination by 
enforcing public accommodation laws trumps the right of individuals to avoid compelled speech 
which conflicts with their genuinely held religious beliefs.180 
                                                          
178 If such a sign were posted, Phillips may not be asked to provide services he would otherwise feel compelled to 
refuse.  While posting that sign may cause some existing and potential customers to choose another bakery, it is less 
deleterious than refraining from baking wedding cakes at all, and pales by comparison to the indignity inflicted on 
same-sex couples who are denied goods and services in the marketplace.  See Culhane, supra note 62, at 237 (“[T]he 
proper balance to strike in cases pitting anti-discrimination imperatives against the freedom of expression allows the 
conscientious objector to state his or her view, but not to deny service based on it.  Because difficult questions can 
arise as to when a statement of belief shades into a coercive (and therefore unacceptable) message, I propose that 
legislators create safe-harbor language that would perhaps be written into existing anti-discrimination laws, and that, 
if followed, would be a defense against discrimination claims.  Business owners, employers, or realtors who choose 
other language to express their beliefs could do so, but at the risk that the language would be interpreted as 
“disinviting” protected classes of people to use their services - and therefore be deemed to run afoul of anti-
discrimination laws.”)  See Alex Riley, Religious Liberty vs. Discrimination: Striking a Balance When Business 
Owners Refuse Service to Same-Sex Couples Due to Religious Beliefs, 40 S. Ill. U. L.J. 301, 318-20 (2016) 
(providing a model statute to allow refusals by those in the wedding industry to provide goods and services to same-
sex weddings). 
179 Id. at 144. 
180 See Adam K. Hersh, A Structural Reconsideration of Religious Exemptions from Nondiscrimination Laws Since 
Obergefell, 70 STAN L. REV. 260, 317 (2018): 
 
But the question is not whether religious conflicts between sellers and buyers or employers and employees 
are desirable; they are inevitable in a pluralistic society.  Rather, the question is: When such conflicts arise, 
which side should be allowed to invoke the force of law?  The answer that prevents religious fracturing and 
allows for pluralistic discourse is that government should avoid supporting parties who seek to exclude 
participants from the market on religious grounds and should instead support parties who risk exclusion from 
X. Recap 
 
The discussion and analysis provided above supports the following conclusions:  
 
(1) While a good argument exists that Phillips’ creation of customized wedding cake qualifies as 
expression protected under the First Amendment, his refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig 
and Mullins obviates any infringement on Phillips’ artistic expression.   
 
(2) Compelling Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples likely constitutes compelled 
speech, because doing so forces him to acknowledge same-sex weddings should be celebrated 
contrary to his religious beliefs and, because he is a successful and well known baker, he is 
associated with the wedding cake.   
 
(3) Phillips has a good argument that Colorado’s public accommodating law mandating his 
creation and sale of wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates the First Amendment protection 
against compelled speech, provided the interests advanced by protecting his right of expression 
outweigh the interests advanced by enforcement of Colorado’s public accommodation law. 
 
(4) Phillips cannot refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples under the Exercise of 
Religion Clause, because Colorado’s public accommodation law appears to be a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability, and unintended and incidental infringement on the religious freedom 
of Phillips does not make the accommodation law unconstitutional. 
 
(5) Because the interests advanced by enforcement of Colorado’s public accommodation law in 
protecting same-sex couples from sexual orientation discrimination substantially outweigh the 
First Amendment interest advanced in protecting Phillips from compelled speech, Phillips likely 
cannot succeed in his compelled speech claim.  
 
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jack Phillips, a baker 
who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, because doing so violated his deeply 
held religious beliefs.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado  Court of 
                                                          
the market--the victims of religious discrimination, not the perpetrators.  A constitutional rule providing that 
answer is one that will ensure confident pluralism's endurance in the face of ineradicable difference. 
 
Another commentator argues in favor of narrowly tailored exemptions for those individuals who refuse to sell goods 
and services on the basis of their sincerely held religious beliefs.  See Sarah Jackson, The Unaccommodating Nature 
of Accommodations Laws: Why Narrowly Tailored Exemptions to Antidiscrimination Statutes Make for a More 
Inclusive Society, 68 ALA. L. REV. 855, 876 (2017): 
 
A narrowly tailored exemption for these objectors, rather than a black and white consideration of permissible 
encroachments on rights, could protect the people on both sides of the issue.  The Sherbert compelling interest 
test is an option for situations in which the competing interests are those of individuals, rather than a state 
interest burdening an individual's liberty.  In these wedding vendor cases, two individuals are protected by a 
state antidiscrimination statute and their opposition is protected under the First Amendment.  A narrow 
exemption provides an avenue for the states to continue pursuing antidiscrimination ends while still 
respecting the religious liberty of individuals. 
Appeals upholding the determination of the Colorado Human Rights Commission that the baker’s 
refusal violated Colorado’s public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  The U.S. Supreme Court also invalidated the order of the Commission 
requiring Phillips to cease and desist his refusal to create cakes for same-sex couples, because the 
Commission failed to consider Phillips’s sincere religious objections with requisite neutrality.   
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, like the month of March which comes in like a lion 
and leaves like a lamb, failed to live up to the heightened expectations that the decision would be 
a blockbuster.  Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court sidestepped the chore of reconciling two 
fundamental principles: whether the baker’s refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex 
marriage reception was protected by the First Amendment and whether Colorado has authority to 
protect the rights and dignity of gay people who seek to purchase goods and services in the 
marketplace.  In that sense, the decision is a dud.  Neither party prevailed, and Jack Phillips remains 
free to refuse to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples.  Perhaps it is all for the better.  Perhaps 
the country simply is not ready for a U.S. Supreme Court decision choosing whether a baker’s 
ability to practice his religion freely is more important than the right of a same-sex couple to be 
free of discrimination in the purchase of goods and services.   
 Nonetheless, while those excited about the prospects for a blockbuster decision are likely 
disappointed, Masterpiece Cakeshop might have an alternative use: serving as a case study 
permitting students to analyze fundamental and clashing principles underlying the case: whether 
Phillips’ creation of custom designed wedding cakes is a form of protected speech, whether 
requiring Phillips to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples violates his right not to engage in 
compelled speech, whether Phillips can refuse to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple as 
an exercise of religion, and whether denying same-sex couples the right to purchase goods and 
services for their wedding can be constitutionally prohibited under state anti-discrimination laws.   
